This lawsuit dated May 31, 2007 is against the Los Angeles County Department of Social Services. It alleges fraud, violation of kinship care rights, and loss of family love and support. It was filed by a former foster child and adoptive child.
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LAW FIRM, APC
Attorneys for Plaintiff: ELIZABETH J. BRUCE AKA ELIZABETH J. ALLDRIDGE
SUPERIOR COURT FOR STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
ELIZABETH J. BRUCE AKA ELIZABETH J. ALLDRIDGE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, and DOES 1 through 20, Inclusive,
Defendants,
CASE NO.
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF MANDATORY PUBLIC ENTITY DUTIES
TO ALL PARTIES HEREIN AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD
Plaintiff, ELIZABETH J. BRUCE, aka, ELIZABETH J. ALLDRIDGE, alleges as follows:
1. Plaintiff, ELIZABETH J. BRUCE, aka, ELIZABETH J. ALLDRIDGE (Date of Birth: April 17, 1972) is currently a resident of Clark County, Nevada, who lawfully changed her last name on March 8, 2007, from Alldridge to Bruce as part of her divorce decree. At all times pertinent hereto Plaintiff was a dependent of the Juvenile Court, County of Los Angeles, pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code §300(b) (and all predecessor statutes) and related California Regulations, subject to the control and authority of the County of Los Angeles Department of Public Social Services and related divisions or departments, including but not limited to what was known as the Department of Adoptions (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant DPSS”), throughout all proceeds related to or stemming from Plaintiff’s foster care and adoption.
2. Defendant DPSS was at all times pertinent hereto a department of a public entity created and existing under the laws of the State of California, with authority over children such as plaintiff.
3. The true and complete names of DOES 1 through 20 whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise are unknown to plaintiff who therefore sues said defendants by such fictitious names. At this time plaintiff does not have knowledge of all aspects of the claims set forth herein. Plaintiff will seek leave of Court to amend this Complaint to identify each Doe defendant’s name and capacity when same have been ascertained.
4. At all times herein mentioned, each defendant was acting through authorized employees or other agents, and was the agent, authorized representative, employee, or otherwise acting on behalf of each of the remaining defendants. In doing the things hereinafter mentioned, each defendant was acting within the course and scope of his or her employment, representation, and authority with the knowledge and consent of each remaining defendant.
5. The conduct of each defendant as alleged herein combined, cooperated, and contributed to the conduct of each other defendant such as to cause the herein described incidents, injuries, and events.
6. Plaintiff’s first suspension of any claim against Defendant DPSS occurred in late February 2006 or most likely in early March 2006 during a face to face meeting with Ms. Betty Anderson, a former aid of Assemblyperson Karen Bass, 47th Assembly District. Plaintiff sought Ms. Anderson’s assistance to acquire her Los Angeles County Department of Social Services records related to her foster care and eventual adoption. Plaintiff sought these records as part of her effort to find her biological mother (her biological father Donald Bruce died on February 26, 1974), and to acquire all available medical information related to both biological parents not only for herself, but more particularly for her children (her eldest son has suffered his entire life from Hydrocephalus.) During Plaintiff’s meeting with Ms. Betty Anderson, the Court records she was able to acquire from the Los Angeles County Juvenile Court concerning her adoption (all prior attempts to acquire DPSS social worker records were refused and/or denied) were discussed and reviewed. Ms. Betty Anderson pointed out to Plaintiff that it appeared the 1975 signature of her biological mother relinquishing all custody and control of Plaintiff when compared to signatures from Plaintiff’s biological mother’s criminal records appeared to be the signatures of different individuals. At this moment Plaintiff for the first time suspected that there may have been some violation of Defendant DPSS’s duties. Up until this meeting with Ms. Betty Anderson, Plaintiff was not looking for and had no suspicion or knowledge whatsoever of any type of a claim or injury related to any conduct of Defendant DPSS, as her motivation for acquiring records from Defendant DPSS was to find her mother and to find out all potential medical information she could.
7. On August 22, 2006, Plaintiff timely served by mail a Governmental Claim for Damages to Person or Property on Defendant DPSS pursuant to Government Code §911.2 (Exhibit A attached hereto). Defendant DPSS denied this claim in writing by mail on December 1, 2006. This suit is being filed within six (6) months of Defendant DPSS rejection of Plaintiff’s claim.
8. Plaintiff is the biological daughter of Brenda Joan Allen and Donald MacKenzie Bruce. In or about July 1973 Defendant DPSS initiated proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code §300 et seq. (or their predecessor statutes), and eventually acquired physical and legal custody of Plaintiff. Defendant DPSS was under a mandatory duty to acquire either a Court ruling of involuntary relinquishment of custody by Plaintiff’s biological mother or acquire the signature of Plaintiff’s biological mother on a “RELINQUISHMENT (Out of County)” County of Los Angeles Department of Adoptions form before placing Plaintiff up for adoption. Defendant DPSS acquired neither. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief Defendant DPSS falsified, forged, or otherwise misrepresented the signature of Plaintiff’s biological mother Brenda Joan Allen on August 26, 1975, on a “Relinquishment (Out of County)” form in violation of its mandatory duties order to expedite adoption.
9. On September 26, 1975, Plaintiff was placed in the home of Harold Augustus Barlow and Carole Leah Barlow, potential adoptive parents pursuant to a Notice of Adoption. This placement by Defendant DPSS and eventual adoption of Plaintiff by the same adopting parents was in further violation of Defendant DPSS’s mandatory duties in that she was first required to be placed with family members of Plaintiff, who had priority rights to physical and legal custody of Plaintiff over her eventual adoptive parents. Plaintiff’s family was ready, able and willing to assume all physical and legal custody of Plaintiff, to provide for her in all aspects and to provide her with a loving home. Said family members of Plaintiff included, but were not limited to, her paternal grandmother and grandfather who sent Defendant DPSS and others letters repeatedly offering and in all aspects indicating their willingness to take care of their granddaughter in a loving home.
10. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant DPSS’s breach of the foregoing mandatory duties, Plaintiff was placed in foster care of Defendant DPSS and eventually given up for adoption to Harold Augustus Barlow and Carole Leah Barlow. Harold Augustus Barlow died before Plaintiff turned four (4) years of age, and throughout the remaining years of her minority Plaintiff was neglected, abused, and generally ignored by her only remaining foster mother Carole Leah Barlow. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendant DPSS’s breach of the foregoing mandatory duties, Plaintiff suffered personal injury, the loss of care, comfort, love and society of her biological family, suffered severe emotional and personal distress, and continues to suffer personal injury and distress associated with the loss of so many years of family love and support in addition to continuing to suffer the consequences of her life as an unwanted adoptive child.
11. The damages sought herein are in excess of the minimal jurisdictional limits of this Court.
WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant DPSS, and DOES 1 through 20, as follows:
1. General damages in excess of the jurisdictional limits of this Court;
2. All medical, incidental expenses, and special damages according to proof;
3. Loss of earnings and earning capacity according to proof;
4. Costs of suit;
5. Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; and
6. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
DATED: May 31, 2007 LAW FIRM, APC
BY: ____________________________