Tracie Palmer left this message on our page for attorney requests. I felt it was too long for that page but is important enough that everyone here should see it. Please note that at the end she states she is looking for an attorney for her child.

This is an excellent In Pro Per Complaint against the county and social workers. All of you who are facing injustice from county agencies may want to start writing something similar. - ljm

Tracie Palmer
1428 West Street
Redding, CA 96001
530.244.0988
In Pro Per
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHASTA
oo0oo

TRACIE PALMER, an individual, and
LUCIA D. PALMIERI, a minor, by and through her Guardian ad Litem, TRACIE PALMER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

SHASTA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES DIVISION,
MICHAEL SCHWEITZER, individually, and as an employee of Children and Family Services,
HOLLY HETZEL, individually, and as an employee of Children and Family Services,
GAYLE MITCHELL, individually, and as an employee of Children and Family Services,
DEBRA ANDERSON, individually, and as an employee of Children and Family Services,
TINA MARTINEZ, individually and as an employee of Children and Family Services,
RANDEE MAEDA, individually, and as an employee of Children and Family Services,
and DOES 1-25, inclusive,
Defendants. )
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Case No.: 166491

SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

Plaintiffs Tracie Palmer (herein after referred to as “Plaintiff Palmer”) and Lucia D. Palmieri (herein after referred to as “Plaintiff Palmieri”) allege as follows:
1. This is a civil action seeking damages against Defendants for the commission of acts, under color of state law, that deprived Plaintiff Palmer and Plaintiff Palmieri of rights secured to them by law and the Constitutions of the United States and the State of California. Damages are also sought against Defendants for the commission of tortious acts in breach of California State law.
2. Plaintiffs are mother (Palmer) and daughter (Plaintiff Palmieri) and at all relevant times resided in Shasta County, California.
3. Defendant Shasta County Department of Social Services, Children and Family Services Division (CFS) is a governmental agency within and part of Shasta County, California.
4. Defendant Michael Schweitzer was at all relevant times, including September 15, 2006, an employee of CFS. He is sued by Plaintiffs in both his individual and official capacities.
5. Defendant Holly Hetzel was at all relevant times, including September 15, 2006, an employee of CFS. She is sued by Plaintiffs in both her individual and official capacities.
6. Defendant Gayle Mitchell was at all relevant times, including September 15, 2006, an employee of CFS. She is sued by Plaintiffs in both her individual and official capacities.
7. Defendant Debra Anderson was at all relevant times, including September 15, 2006, an employee of CFS. She is sued by Plaintiffs in both her individual and official capacities.
8. Defendant Tina Martinez was at all relevant times, including September 15, 2006, an employee of CFS. She is sued by Plaintiffs in both her individual and official capacities.
9. Defendant Randee Maeda was at all relevant times, including September 15, 2006, an employee of CFS. She is sued by Plaintiffs in both her individual and official capacities.
10. Plaintiffs do not know the true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise, of defendants sued as Does 1 through 25, inclusive, and therefore sues these defendants by such fictitious names pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 474. Plaintiffs will seek leave to amend this complaint to allege the true names and capacities of these defendants when ascertained, together with additional charging allegations as necessary. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that each of the fictitiously named defendants is legally responsible in some manner for the occurrences or actions relevant to those occurrences alleged and for Plaintiffs’ resulting damages.
11. At all times pertinent hereto, each of the defendants was the agent or employee of each of the remaining defendants and has ratified and/or approved the acts of the remaining defendants.
12. At all times material to this complaint, each defendant acted or purported to act under color of the law, customs, and usages of Shasta County and California.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
13. Plaintiffs lived in the home at 6044 Emerald Lane in Redding, California from October 2000 until May 2002 and then again from August 2003 until September 15, 2006. Plaintiff Palmer made her living as a freelance PC technician out of the garage/shop and paid a share of rent and other household bills in those months.
14. The home was owned by Marcella Shatnawi (herein after referred to as “Shatnawi”), Plaintiffs’ sister/aunt, and the three lived there with their mother/grandmother, Earleen Smith.
15. On September 7, 2006, Earleen Smith died in the home. It was then-five-year-old Plaintiff Palmieri who discovered her grandmother in her room.
16. A neighbor took Plaintiff Palmieri in for the week to minimize any further upheaval to her while Plaintiff Palmer and Shatnawi were handling the necessary plans and arrangements.
17. On September 15, 2006 at or about 7:00 a.m. Redding Police Officers Harry Bishop, Luke Blehm, and Officer Bryan arrived at the home, stating they had received an “anonymous report” of noxious odors consistent with methamphetamine manufacturing coming from the home.
18. Plaintiff Palmieri was not at home at the time, or even in residence. When police arrived at the residence, the child was at school.
19. Upon making entry to the home, the officers claimed discovery of Ziploc baggies and paraphernalia, “with drug residue”.
20. Police also claimed to discover, among thousands of computer parts and electronic components in the shop/garage and the dozens they checked out, a used computer allegedly stolen from the Shasta County Sheriff’s office.
21. The officers then contacted Defendant Holly Hetzel and suggested an assessment and investigation by CFS at the residence.
22. Police confiscated all items that they found objectionable as evidence. The officers concluded that Shatnawi was not involved in or responsible for the seized property. Neither department reported concerns regarding the home itself.
23. Shatnawi (Plaintiff Palmieri’s ostensible non-offending caretaker) was also willing, able, and requesting immediate care of Plaintiff Palmieri at that time.
24. The child was instead summarily and simultaneously detained by CFS social workers - seized from elementary school during her school day. It is possible that some of the specific identities of social workers on the scene are as yet unknown to Plaintiffs, but they would be named herein or included in Does 1-25.
25. No one at the scene gave Plaintiff Palmer any information – or access to information – regarding rights or procedures in the juvenile court.
26. Defendant social workers and Does 1-25 made no contact whatsoever with Plaintiff Palmer from September 15, until Wednesday, September 20, 2006 nor was she given any direction, information, or access to information regarding the matter from anyone.
27. Notice of the Detention Hearing and a copy of the petition were served on Plaintiff Palmer by Defendant Mitchell on September 20, 2006.
28. The Detention Hearing commenced moments later and the only evidence heard was offered by Defendant social workers, County Counsel, and Does 1-25. The court ordered Plaintiff Palmieri further detained in the custody of the court.
29. Plaintiffs’ first visit was on October 5, 2006 and they began regular, monitored visitation at the LINCS offices, which housed most of CFS’ social workers (and did at all relevant times).
30. Plaintiff Palmer authorized all county agencies to share case information, gave CFS all family history information, received the initial case plan, and in mid-December 2006, Plaintiff Palmer submitted a change of address to CFS - duly filed with the courts.
INTRODUCTORY ALLEGATIONS
31. Defendants summarily seized Plaintiff Palmieri from her school, home, and family without a warrant, just or probable cause and in the absence of exigent circumstances (in violation of WIC §300.2, §306(a)(2)) - not because they had to, but because they could.
32. The child was not properly and lawfully released from custody when initial dependency petition was not timely filed (pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code (WIC) §313), or when the Detention Hearing was not timely held (pursuant to WIC §315).
33. Defendants Mitchell, Maeda, CFS, and Does 1-25 barred all entitled contact between Plaintiffs (pursuant to WIC §308(a)), with no claim of detriment to the child, thereby denying Plaintiff Palmer’s fundamental liberty interest in soothing and reassuring her child and depriving the five year old of her mother’s essential, elemental, recuperative comfort.
34. Defendants CFS, social workers, and Does 1-25 put Plaintiff Palmieri at untenable, unnecessary risk when and as they detained her in the foster care of strangers. This was in no way mitigated by the eight placements the child was subjected to in just twelve months.
35. The initial petition and Detention Report, filed by Defendant workers and Does 1-25, and co-signed by Defendant Maeda, were made up almost entirely of conclusory statements having no basis in fact and wholly fabricated charges and allegations.
36. These fabrications included, but were not limited to, allegations and assertions that:
a. On September 15, 2006, Plaintiff Palmer was being “arrested for Child Endangerment”,
b. Plaintiff Palmer “was unable to make an appropriate plan for the care of the child prior to her incarceration”,
c. Plaintiff Palmer had left her daughter “with no provision for support”,
d. “The home contained drugs” and that objectionable and illegal items were “found in the home”,
e. On September 15, 2006, Plaintiff Palmer had “substance abuse” and “anger control problem” that “put the child at risk of harm”,
f. Plaintiff Palmer had a CFS “history of…physical abuse [of the child] and [posed] substantial risk [to the child] ”,
g. CFS provided “reasonable services”, albeit in the distant past, but Plaintiff Palmer had failed to benefit from them, and,
h. On September 15, 2006, “there were no services that could have prevented” Plaintiff Palmieri’s immediate seizure.
Each and every one of these statements was false, and known to be false, at the time they were made and/or verified by Defendants.
37. Defendants and each of them intentionally withheld and/or concealed exculpatory evidence from the Juvenile Court that would not support their actions or claims, and would likely confirm the viability of Plaintiff Palmieri’s immediate release to a responsible family member. These included, but were not limited to, the following:
a. Neither RPD nor CFS expressed concern about the residence and it was searched and cleared by several agents of both departments,
b. At the time of her removal, Plaintiff Palmieri’s physical condition and emotional health were hearty and robust; Defendants concurred, seeing no need for medical consultation,
c. In spite of Defendants’ claims of risks and dangers that Plaintiff Palmer posed to the child, there was never a specific instance of abuse or neglect claimed by CFS anywhere at any time,
d. Plaintiff Palmieri told Defendants that she had suffered no physical or emotional abuse or neglect prior to her removal, nor was Plaintiff Palmer accused of any specific abuse.
e. The initial interview of Plaintiff Palmieri by CFS workers (pursuant to WIC §328) was exculpatory yet suppressed,
f. By virtue of the September 15 ‘inspections’ by RPD and CFS, Shatnawi (and her home) had already been all but qualified as a responsible relative placement, an ostensibly nonoffending caretaker who was willing, able, and requesting interim custody of Plaintiff Palmieri,
g. There were several additional alternatives available for the child’s interim care,
h. Defendant Mitchell did not relay Plaintiff Palmer’s voluntary pledge to the court (made before the Detention Hearing commenced) that she would vacate the residence so that the child could remain.
Each and every one of these mitigating, exculpatory facts was material, and known to be material, when and as they were concealed and withheld from the court by Defendants.
38. Defendants failed to proceed in accordance with the Welfare and Institutions Code by:
a. Refusing to conduct any real investigation into the situation on September 15, 2006,
b. Negating possible scenarios that could facilitate maintaining Plaintiff Palmieri safely in her own home (pursuant to §306(b), §309(a) and §309(d)(1)),
c. Refusing to engage reasonable efforts and services to maintain Plaintiff Palmieri in her home (pursuant to §306(b), §309(a) and §309(d)(1)),
d. Failing to inform Plaintiff Palmer of anything related to the case, including the child’s status or how she was faring, their rights, or the impending court hearings and procedures (pursuant to WIC §307.4(a) & §307.4(a)(1)),
39. Defendants blocked any and all meaningful access by Plaintiffs to the juvenile court, with and through the above and the following, but not limited to:
a. Summarily seizing the child, unlawfully limiting the time Plaintiff Palmer had to discover her options before the initial hearing,
b. Verifying the above referenced falsehoods on the initial petition and submitting them as fact in their pre-detention report to the court,
c. Withholding information vital and entitled to Plaintiff Palmer and the Juvenile Court,
d. Not timely filing petition (pursuant to §311(a)), giving Plaintiff Palmer almost no time or information to educate herself regarding dependency proceedings,
e. Not timely serving notice of the Detention Hearing with the required copy of the petition (pursuant to WIC §290.2,),
f. Not timely holding Detention Hearing (pursuant to WIC §315),
g. Preventing Plaintiff Palmer being heard in any meaningful way at the Detention Hearing by not disclosing and otherwise denying Plaintiff Palmer’s right to subpoena, confront and cross-examine all relevant witnesses.
h. Plaintiff Palmer was not made aware of her rights, or that she had any (pursuant to WIC §307.4(a), §311(b), §319(a), §341).
40. Each of these actions – taken individually – was unlawful, unconstitutional, and unnecessarily punitive on their own.
41. However, their actions – taken as a series of steps in an overall plan - demonstrated a considered punitive strategy toward Plaintiffs - that proved more damaging in anthology than the sum of Defendants’ cumulative acts. Defendants and each of them executed this conduct in diametric opposition to their own mission statement, the Legislative intent of the WIC, and the well established constitutional rights and liberty interests of Plaintiffs.
42. Collectively, the facts corroborate Plaintiffs’ claim of intentional, planned, and routine objectives to debase Plaintiff Palmer, maintain Plaintiffs’ separation, and prolong the dependency of the child. Further, considered in total, reconciling Defendants’ handling of this family with Plaintiff Palmieri’s health, welfare or best interests cannot be done within reason or non-fiction.
43. Defendants’ complex deceptions and heavy-handed, malevolent manipulations made CFS social workers the only contributors of evidence and argument at the Detention Hearing. Thus, Defendants and each of them were completely unopposed by the unprepared, uninformed, and vulnerable parent of their own deliberate design.
44. Defendants and each of them enjoyed and relied on a presumptive integrity conferred by the very court on which they perpetrated this fraud. Predictably, Defendants Mitchell, Maeda, and Does 1-25 succeeded in securing a court order for the child’s continued detention on September 20, 2006. Plaintiffs claim the court order was the intended result of CFS’ well-orchestrated, deftly choreographed, and oft-rehearsed tactical steps.
45. In late December 2006, Plaintiff Palmer discussed filing a request for change of court order with Defendant Mitchell and that she would be relieving her counsel to do so.
46. On or about January 3, 2007, the probation officer assigned to assess Plaintiff Palmer (for work release in lieu of jail) phoned Mitchell for Plaintiff’s contact information. Defendant Mitchell responded that she had “no idea where” to find her.
47. This fabrication resulted - directly - in the probation officer’s misguided recommendation that Plaintiff Palmer’s sentencing be continued and her “custody status be reviewed”. It was - directly causing her unjust and unnecessary remand on January 24, 2007. Plaintiff Palmer was then forced to appear on her petition, in juvenile court on February 20, 2007, wearing an orange jumpsuit and shackles, in custody.
48. Defendant Anderson and Does 1-25 arbitrarily “invalidated” credible drug treatment and mental health assessments conducted by providers of CFS’ choosing, forcing Plaintiff Palmer’s submission to both arduous processes a second time. Moreover, Defendant Anderson insisted on specific individual assessors for these repeated “assessments” in an attempt to manipulate, influence, and control their results - rendering the sessions “treatment intakes”.
49. The required mental health assessment was then “upgraded” to a full psychiatric evaluation, even where no “red flags” or warnings were raised by the original and qualified assessor.
50. In the case of the drug treatment assessment, Defendant’s chosen counselor was actually located in, and working out of, the CFS office.
51. In the case of the mental health assessment, Defendant’s chosen counselor was unduly influenced by the enhanced and highly prejudicial “referral” crafted by Defendant Anderson and Does 1-25.
52. Defendant Anderson and Does 1-25 stalled these and other provider referrals and services to insinuate Plaintiff Palmer’s inaction and limited progress toward family reunification. Defendant Anderson took full advantage of this engineered advantage in her subsequent review reports to the court. This also delayed and arrested any development of professional, respected advocates for Plaintiffs, keeping the only opinions and evidence offered in and to the court that of CFS workers.
53. Using these and other tactics and misrepresentations, Defendant Anderson and Does 1-25 persuaded the court, at several junctures, to retain Plaintiff Palmieri as a dependent out-of-home, separated from her mother and denying Plaintiffs any contact that Defendant Anderson could not regulate or monitor directly for an additional 8 months (through September, 2007).
54. Defendant Anderson and Does 1-25 “interviewed” Plaintiff Palmieri (just back in Shatnawi’s custody). In it, she asked the child if she ever “considered going to church without your Aunt [Shatnawi]”.
55. Defendant Anderson and Does 1-25 reported to the court - in part - that the 6-year-old’s face was “observed to be without emotion” and she “had a moment of confusion or fear”. Plaintiff Palmieri was acutely traumatized by Defendant’s self-serving, insensitive, monstrous mode of inquiry as she tried to contemplate being alone again – and almost immediately after her return.
56. Defendant then reports that Plaintiffs could not be granted an extra weekly visit at another church since Plaintiff Palmieri had “chosen” her “religious preference”, Plaintiff Palmer had no right to “change” it , and Defendant could not in good conscience “force” her to go with her mother.
57. As a direct result of Defendants’ punitive, disparaging, unlawful, and unrelenting campaign against them, Plaintiffs were needlessly and maliciously separated for approximately 14 months.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Violation of Plaintiffs’ Federal Civil Rights against All Defendants)
(42 U.S.C. § 1983)
58. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by this reference each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 12, 13-30 of Facts Common to All Causes of Action, and 31-57 of Introductory Allegations as if fully set forth herein.
59. At all relevant times herein, Defendants purported their unfettered prerogative - conferred on them by the court - to remove Plaintiff Palmieri from her school, home and family and that it was entirely within the Department’s discretion to proceed at will. Plaintiff Palmer was told to comply with each and every demand made of her or her parental rights would be in great peril in the coming months.
60. Defendants and each of them violated the federal constitutional rights of the Plaintiffs by:
a. Summarily seizing the child from her home, parent, and family care without a warrant, just or probable cause, and absent exigent circumstances, in violation of several sections of the California Welfare & Institutions Code,
b. Crafting a counterfeit allegation presented to the court on the initial verified petition (WIC 300(g)) in a successful and concerted effort to obtain a tainted judicial order separating mother from daughter,
c. Denying Plaintiffs any physical or conversational contact, where there was no claim of Plaintiff Palmer’s detriment to the child (pursuant to WIC §309(a)),
d. Withholding exculpatory evidence that may well have changed not only the Detention Hearing findings, orders, and outcomes, but those of every subsequent hearing (pursuant to WIC §315), and confirmed the suitability of leaving Plaintiff Palmieri in her home and immediately reuniting mother and daughter,
e. Not timely releasing the child or filing the initial petition (pursuant to WIC §313),
f. Not timely serving Plaintiffs notice of the initial hearing (pursuant to WIC §290.2),
g. Not timely releasing the child or holding the Detention Hearing (pursuant to WIC §315),
h. Blocking all meaningful access of Plaintiffs to the Juvenile Court by withholding mandatory disclosures from Plaintiff Palmer (pursuant to WIC §307.4 and regarding §300, et seq.),
i. Refusing any investigation whatsoever into Plaintiff Palmer’s claims or proof of innocence, even when presented the opportunity to do so at very nominal cost to the County, and
j. Conducting a defective and one-sided investigation into the facts concerning the suitability of Plaintiff Palmieri’s home or immediately reuniting mother and daughter, and ignoring clear and obvious indications that this was appropriate and necessary for Plaintiff Palmieri’s health and well being.
61. These official policies, customs, practices and/or directives of Defendant CFS are causally and affirmatively linked to the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and were used, relied upon, and carried out by defendant social workers who in turn targeted Plaintiffs through their iniquitous and malevolent conduct without fear of sanction or reprisal.
62. These policies, customs, practices and/or directives of Defendant CFS are causally and affirmatively linked to the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and yet remain standard and routinely relied upon by Defendants even where they are not formally or publically enacted.
63. This conduct was a major cause of the lengthy separation of mother and daughter, causing physical, emotional and economic injuries to Plaintiffs, in amounts to be proven at trial, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. §1983.
64. Throughout, Defendants’ conduct was malicious and oppressive and was intended to cause injury if not carried out with deliberate indifference to and callous disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights and well-being, justifying an award of punitive damages as to individual defendants.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Violation of Plaintiffs’ State Civil Rights against All Defendants)
(Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1)
65. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by this reference each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 12, 13-30 of Facts Common to All Causes of Action, 31-57 of Introductory Allegations, and 59-64 of First Cause of Action as if fully set forth herein.
66. These specific acts by Defendants violated Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of the State of California and Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1.
67. Plaintiffs were harmed by the conduct of Defendants, as enumerated above, and that conduct was a major factor in causing physical, emotional and economic injuries to Plaintiffs, in amounts to be proved at trial and justifying punitive damages as to individual defendants.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Brought By Both Plaintiffs for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
(Against All Defendants)
68. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by this reference each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 12, 13-30 of Facts Common to All Causes of Action, 31-57 of Introductory Allegations, and 59-64 of First Cause of Action as if fully set forth herein.
69. Defendants used their positions of authority to damage the interests of Plaintiffs. Defendants’ actions in removing and detaining Plaintiff Palmieri were outrageous by any standard of decency, yet they acted even in the knowledge that their conduct would likely result in serious damage to one or both Plaintiffs, and with reckless disregard for Plaintiffs’ well-being. The foreseeable susceptibility of a small child and a single mother forcibly separated without reason had no effect and Defendants did not relent in their sustained campaign of attack on Plaintiffs, even when they knew it to be unwarranted.
70. Mother and child suffered shock, fear, indignity, terror and apprehension due directly to actions taken by Defendants. Plaintiffs were left elementally vulnerable and further frightened, humiliated, and terrorized by their ongoing conduct.
71. Defendant CFS breached a duty of due care owed to Plaintiffs by failing to provide adequate guidance, oversight, supervision and training to their social workers.
72. Defendant CFS breached a duty of due care owed to Plaintiffs by failing to implement or enforce any policy that would preclude and prevent the unlawful removal of children from their homes by social workers in their employ.
73. The actions of the Defendants described above were intentional and carried out with deliberate indifference to and callous disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights, well being, and best interests.
74. The acts and/or omissions of each Defendant promoted the protracted separation of mother and child and constituted a major factor in causing Plaintiffs’ physical, emotional and economic injuries. The emotionally charged environment rendered Plaintiffs especially susceptible to damages caused by Defendants’ targeted attacks. By ambushing Plaintiffs, brandishing their positions, and exploiting the induced vulnerabilities of Plaintiffs, Defendants maximized that damage, justifying punitive damages against individual defendants, in amounts to be proved at trial.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Brought By Both Plaintiffs for Negligence)
(Against All Defendants)
75. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by this reference each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 12, 13-30 of Facts Common to All Causes of Action, 31-57 of Introductory Allegations, 59-64 of First Cause of Action, and 71-72 of Third Cause of Action as if fully set forth herein.
76. Defendants CFS, Martinez, Schweitzer, Hetzel, Mitchell, Maeda and their supervisors and Does 1-25 breached a duty of due care owed to plaintiffs by failing to provide adequate guidance, oversight and supervision to Defendant social workers. Defendant social workers’ actions harmed plaintiffs by summarily removing Plaintiff Palmieri from her home, parent and family without a warrant and absent exigent circumstances, in violation of California Welfare and Institutes Codes §300, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309 et. seq.
77. Defendants and each of them were aware of the foreseeable perils their willful misconduct subjected Plaintiffs to and the injuries to Plaintiffs as they accumulated. However, Defendants did nothing to mitigate either the risks or the resulting injuries to Plaintiffs.
78. Every action by Defendants and each of them has compounded and accumulated, developing an overall punitive philosophy and approach in their dealings with Plaintiffs.
79. To the extent that the actions of Defendants and each of them described above were not deliberate or intentional, they were done with gross negligence and deliberate indifference to and callous disregard for Plaintiffs’ rights and well being.
80. Defendant Anderson failed and refused to retrieve Plaintiff Palmieri’s belongings from the foster homes that housed Plaintiff Palmieri, where Plaintiff Palmer could not request or compel their production, upon Plaintiff Palmieri’s return to her mother.
81. The acts and/or omissions of each Defendant constituted a major factor in causing Plaintiffs’ physical, emotional and economic injuries, including justified punitive damages against individual defendants, in amounts to be proved at trial.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(For False Imprisonment of Plaintiff Palmieri)
(Against Defendants CFS, Mitchell, Maeda, Schweitzer, Hetzel, and Does 1-25)
82. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by this reference each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 12, 13-30 of Facts Common to All Causes of Action, 31-57 of Introductory Allegations, 59-64 of First Cause of Action, as if fully set forth herein.
83. Defendants CFS, Michael Schweitzer, Holly Hetzel, Gayle Mitchell, Tina Martinez, Randee Maeda, and Does 1-25 intentionally removed or sanctioned the imminent confinement and removal of Plaintiff Palmieri from her home and family, without warrant and absent exigency, in violation of California Welfare and Institutes Codes §300, 305, 306, 307,308, 309 et. seq., Further, Defendants improperly investigated, detained and maintained Plaintiff Palmieri outside her home.
84. In the absence of a timely filed petition, or a timely held hearing, Plaintiff Palmieri’s detention was not lawfully authorized at the time of the seizure, nor was it consensual.
85. The moment the mandated timeframe to release Plaintiff Palmieri or file the initial petition had expired, Defendants and each of them effectively seized her again and again without lawful authorization.
86. The moment the mandated timeframe to release Plaintiff Palmieri or hold the initial hearing had expired, Defendants and each of them effectively seized her yet again and again without lawful authorization.
87. These acts were authorized, condoned, directed, and/or ratified by Defendant CFS and Does 1-25.
88. Plaintiffs suffered significant physical and emotional damages as a result.
89. The acts and/or omissions of each Defendant constituted a major factor in causing Plaintiffs physical, emotional and economic injuries, including punitive damages against individual defendants, in amounts to be proved at trial.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(For False Imprisonment of Plaintiff Palmer)
(Against Defendants CFS, Mitchell, Maeda, and Does 1-25)
90. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by this reference each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 12, 13-30 of Facts Common to All Causes of Action, 31-57 of Introductory Allegations, 59-64 of First Cause of Action, as if fully set forth herein.
91. Defendant Mitchell and Does 1-25 were contacted by a Shasta County probation officer assigned to assess Plaintiff Palmer for probation and report back to the court. Mitchell responded by telling probation she had “no idea” where to find Plaintiff Palmer - in the full knowledge that the officer would then recommend continuing the sentencing hearing until Plaintiff Palmer could be assessed, and remanding her in the interim.
92. Defendant Mitchell and Does 1-25 directly and intentionally caused Plaintiff Palmer’s unjust and unnecessary remand on January 24, 2007. This was outside the scope of Defendant Mitchell’s employment, was not a quasi-judicial or quasi-prosecutorial or discretionary function, and did nothing to advance the dependency case.
93. It is believed by Plaintiffs that this action may have been sanctioned and/or ratified by Defendants Maeda and/or Does 1-25.
94. Plaintiffs suffered significant physical and emotional damages as a result.
95. The acts and omissions of the Defendants constituted a major factor in causing Plaintiffs physical, emotional and economic injuries, including punitive damages against individual defendants, in amounts to be proved at trial.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Fraud and Deceit of Plaintiff Palmer)
(Against Defendants CFS, Mitchell, Maeda, Schweitzer, and Does 1-25)
96. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by this reference each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 12, 13-30 of Facts Common to All Causes of Action, 31-57 of Introductory Allegations, 59-64 of First Cause of Action, as if fully set forth herein.
97. Defendants and each of them concealed the following material facts from Plaintiff Palmer, although it was their duty to disclose same, to wit:
a. Plaintiff Palmer had the right to see to Plaintiff Palmieri’s alternate care prior to her incarceration,
b. Information advising Plaintiff Palmer of her rights and court procedures (pursuant to WIC §307.4),
c. Plaintiffs’ right to contact within 5 hours of their separation, where there was no claim of detriment to the child (pursuant to WIC §308(a)),
d. The actual petition, until just moments before the Detention Hearing, where it was required to be provided with timely notice of hearing 24 hours before said hearing’s commencement (pursuant to WIC §290.2).
e. All rights conferred by the WIC to parents at the Detention Hearing, including, but not limited to, the right to subpoena, confront, and cross examine all relevant witnesses.
98. These material facts were intentionally withheld to ensure that Plaintiff Palmer would not assert or exercise any of her rights at or before the Detention Hearing. Thus, Defendants and each of them defrauded the Plaintiff and the court, securing a tainted court order unopposed in any way by Plaintiff Palmer.
99. Plaintiff Palmer was unaware of any of these rights, that she in fact had any, or how to exercise them at the Detention Hearing. Based on her actions throughout the dependency, it can be said that Plaintiff Palmer would certainly have acted and reacted much differently, had she been aware of all the material facts concealed by Defendants and the impact dependency would likely have on Plaintiffs.
100. But for the concealment of these facts, and Plaintiff Palmer’s ignorant inaction, the outcome of the Detention Hearing would likely have been much different, even sparing Plaintiffs the protracted, needless separation altogether, had she been allowed to exercise the relevant rights guaranteed by law.
101. As a result, Plaintiff Palmer was prejudiced in legal and public forums, forced to overcome erroneous credibility issues in the eyes of the court and the community. This fraud and deceit directly caused irreparable pain and suffering to both Plaintiffs and laid the very foundation for Plaintiffs’ separation under false pretense.
102. Plaintiffs were unwittingly and unwillingly drawn into a contractual relationship with Defendants the moment Plaintiff Palmieri was detained by social workers.
103. Defendants and each of them were subsequently granted broad discretion and control over Plaintiffs’ very lives. The Case Plan, upon its delivery to Plaintiff Palmer, was characterized as the “only way to get [Plaintiff Palmieri] home”. The alternative to Plaintiff Palmer’s satisfying all terms and conditions, approved and ratified by Defendants and each of them, was permanent loss of her parental rights and, in fact, her child.
104. Plaintiffs believe that the Petition, Case Plan and Welfare & Institutions Code constitute an implied contract (conceived, implemented and filed at the will of the Department) between Plaintiffs and Defendants. Offered no real alternatives, Plaintiff Palmer was compelled to comply with an illegal contract, given the gravity of consequences had she not done so.
105. With the court’s binding findings and orders, all parties were then bound by this implied contract, each with rights, rewards, and responsibilities laid out in the Case Plan and the WIC.
106. Plaintiff Palmer’s ‘reward’ for subjectively satisfying these same terms and conditions was the promised return of her daughter and Defendants’ relenting in the pursuit to terminate her parental rights.
107. Had Plaintiff Palmer not performed all conditions to the subjective satisfaction of Defendants and each of them, Plaintiff Palmieri would not have been returned to her and Plaintiff Palmer’s parental rights might well have been terminated by the court at Defendants’ recommendation.
108. Defendants and each of them imposed an illegal contract on Plaintiffs by violating the Welfare and Institutions Code, §§290.2, 300.2, 306(a)(2), 306(b)(3), 307.4, 308(a), 309(a), 309(d)(1), 313(a), 315, 328, 332, 360, 361(a), 361( c), 361( c)(5), 361.1, et seq. when and as they took custody of Plaintiff Palmieri.
109. Because Plaintiffs were forced into this contract as a result of fraud and false pretense, Plaintiffs believe that said contract is null and void from its inception and but for the deceit and bad faith shown by Defendants, Plaintiffs would not have been subjected to the extensive burdens of the contract.
110. The acts and omissions of the Defendants and each of them constituted a major factor in causing Plaintiffs physical, emotional and economic injuries, in amounts, including emotional distress and punitive damages against individual defendants, to be proved at trial.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(By Plaintiffs For Abuse of Process – Against all Defendants)
111. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by this reference each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 12, 13-30 of Facts Common to All Causes of Action, 31-57 of Introductory Allegations, 59-64 of First Cause of Action, as if fully set forth herein.
112. The stated Legislative intent of the Welfare and Institutions Code is to “to preserve and strengthen a child’s family ties whenever possible, removing the child from the custody of his or her parents only when necessary for his or her welfare”. (§16000) “The Legislature hereby declares its intent to encourage the continuity of the family unit” (§16500) and “to use the strengths of families and communities to serve the needs of children who are alleged to be abused or neglected, as described in Section 300, to reduce the necessity for removing these children from their home, [and] to encourage speedy reunification of families when it can be safely accomplished.” (§16500.1)
113. Dependency proceedings are to be initiated only if required to secure the safety and well-being of the child and are strictly for “the protection of the child, not the punishment of the parent”.
114. Defendants misused the court process with the following non-communicative acts:
a. Filing a Dependency Petition in Juvenile Court, in the name of Plaintiff Palmieri, that Defendants knew was false, misleading, and unnecessary;
b. Not advising Plaintiff Palmer of any of her rights or relevant court procedures. Instead, used and maintained her ignorance to ensure that no objections would be raised, no rights would be asserted, and no statement would be demanded of those who removed Plaintiff Palmieri from her home prior to the court authorizing the detention;
c. Withholding exculpatory evidence from the court as enumerated above,
d. Disallowing contact between Plaintiffs as mandated (WIC §308(a));
e. Refusing to assist or allow Plaintiff Palmer to prove her claims of non-culpability, stalling long enough that the proof was lost forever;
f. Not advising Plaintiff Palmer of her rights pertaining to the proceedings;
g. Not timely serving notice of Detention Hearing;
h. Not timely filing the petition;
i. Not timely holding the initial hearing.
115. The Defendants and each of them intended to induce a tainted court order further detaining Plaintiff Palmieri in foster care, and they misused the court’s authority and process to accomplish that objective.
116. In requiring a “suitable home” and “legal” and “steady” income on the Case Plan, Defendants and each of them violated the letter and spirit of the WIC and abused the dependency process.
117. Further, Defendants and each of them promoted and fostered the very circumstances the WIC charges them with helping to ameliorate. The letter and spirit of the WIC mandates that Defendants and each of them actively assist Plaintiffs in overcoming obstacles to family maintenance and reunification – including poverty and homelessness “wherever possible”.
118. In diametric opposition to the Legislature’s intent and the WIC’s mandate, Defendants and each of them promoted, amplified, and influenced circumstances that could then be portrayed to the court as “non-compliance” and unacceptably “minimal progress” toward Case Plan fulfillment.
119. Given the vast purview of social workers, their supervisors, and CFS, the following would be general knowledge throughout the system:
a. By keeping the child detained, the mother is rendered ineligible to receive emergency cash aid from the state (where income was a requirement of the Case Plan),
b. By effectively blocking the only possible emergency income to Plaintiffs, Defendants extended the duration of Plaintiff Palmer’s new homelessness (where getting and keeping a “suitable” home was required by the Case Plan),
c. By fostering and relying on Plaintiff Palmer’s homelessness, Defendants could justify keeping the child detained (where mother posed no actual danger or detriment to her child) due to unfulfilled requirements of the Case Plan.
d. Defendants propagated this cycle of barriers again and again, for as long as they could.
120. All along there were viable options and far less inherently traumatic alternatives to detention and foster care available to CFS. Those options, however, were not then made available to Plaintiffs – nor would Defendants and each of them even disclose their existence.
121. Defendants and each of them did not attempt to preserve and strengthen Plaintiffs’ family ties or encourage Plaintiffs as a family unit at any time during Plaintiff Palmieri’s dependency. From the instant they summarily seized Plaintiff Palmieri, Defendants and each of them implemented a strategy to keep Plaintiff Palmer ignorant of any and all knowledge as to the rights of her family and the relevant court procedures. Ergo, Defendants and each of them used the process for purposes other than those intended and to propagate the unjust separation of mother and daughter.
122. At all times mentioned herein, Defendants and each of them acted willfully with the wrongful intention of injuring Plaintiffs and for an improper and immoral motive amounting to malice in that the afore-referenced tortuous and criminal conduct was intentionally committed by Defendants and was knowingly oppressive, malicious and wanton with the intended purpose to cause harm to Plaintiffs herein.
123. The acts and omissions of the Defendants and each of them constituted a major factor in causing Plaintiffs physical, emotional and economic injuries, in amounts to be proved at trial, including punitive damages against individual defendants.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray for judgment against each and all of the Defendants for the following:
1. Special and general damages according to proof;
2. Punitive damages according to proof;
3. Declaratory relief as appropriate and according to proof;
4. Attorneys’ or other professional fees incurred during suit;
5. Costs of suit;
6. An order voiding the Petition from its inception;
7. An apology from Defendants; and
8. Such other and further relief as the court may deem appropriate.

_________________________________________
Tracie Palmer, for herself and as
Guardian ad Litem for Lucia D. Palmieri

**Now I just need an attorney to rep my daughter - they can dismiss because of lack of counsel - HELP!

In Yreka California a foster child, Craig Britton, is dead. He was almost two years old. He had visitation with his family the day before and seemed fine then. His elderly foster parent didn’t check on him for eleven hours after putting him to bed at 9pm. When she went in to see him in the morning, he was dead. His stomach was empty except for some unidentified leaves.

Did he wake up in the middle of the night hungry, and eat a house plant? Nobody seems to know at this point.

Community members are distressed and confused. Why did this child die? Why was he taken from a loving mother? Why were the grandparents refused kinship care of their beloved grandson? Why are some people blaming the young parents because their non-abused child was in foster care?

Would you like to tell them how you feel about this? Go to: Mother, foster mother want answers in death of toddler by Mike Slizewski, published on September 17, 2009 in the Siskiyou Daily News.

A hearing on December 18, 2008 informed Connecticut state legislators of DCF injustice and cruelty to families. One participant, an out-of-state aunt, told legislators that family members were denied kinship care rights because the court ruled they had no bond with the child, a girl now totally separated from her natural family. Many others came forward to tell legislators their stories of injustice, trauma and distress at the hands of DCF caseworkers.

According to the article written by Arielle Levin Becker, State Representative Toni Walker, a Democrat from New Haven, wept and said, “We as a state have failed miserably in this situation.” One hundred and thirty eight people signed up to testify at this hearing, the last hearing of four, and apparently the only hearing allowing the public to testify. People spoke out about rude DCF social workers and unjust family devastation practices.

The hearings were scheduled in response to the death of an infant in foster care last May.

Source: Familiar Complaints Aired At Hearing On DCF by Arielle Levin Becker published on December 19, 2008 by the Hartford Courant.

This is from activists who are planning a CPS/DPSS class action lawsuit against Riverside County and the State of California for kidnapping children without cause:

We are organizing a class action lawsuit against the State of California, and all parties involved in unlawfully detaining and holding our children against our will, and without cause. We have documented the deep, embedded corruption in the “social services” agencies in California, specifically in Riverside County, conspiring with hospitals, schools, pediatricians and the court system to take possession of our children, without cause. We have already filed three lawsuits, and are looking for other families who have also been annihilated by this Evil. For information about the class action lawsuit, email us with your facts and contact information to build a strong case against these Devils. IF YOU FEEL YOU HAVE BEEN WRONGLY TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF BY CPS, EMAIL US AT fightcpscalifornia -at- gmail.com.

These are the reasons you should be part of this lawsuit:

· CPS manufactures multiple nonexistent/fictitious abuse case scenarios to offset true statistical abuse case information.

· CPS concurrently processes these children from foster care to Adoption, in order to obtain perverse monetary incentives in the form of bonuses.

· CPS provides a market to neighboring agencies and the courts (Judges, psychologists, visitation monitors, court mandated behavioral class instructors, court appointed legal counsel, etc…), in order for them to financially benefit from the foster care/adoption system they themselves perpetuate.

· CPS victimizes innocent families, and draws them into a corrupt system to utilize their children as pawns for this corrupt child commerce.

· CPS is utilized by family court officials and attorneys as an adverse tool to extricate children from one parent to the other, with reference to “parental alienation syndrome,” where in truth, the CPS caseworkers are the ones initiating the alienation of these children from their own birth parents. Caseworkers are never allowed to testify in court under the cloak of “CPS Authority” due to possible misuse or conflict of interest related to right to privacy laws (Very convenient)

· CPS utilizes unlawful & coercive measures to persuade vulnerable parents to submit to statements of nonexistent abuse and false “Case Plans,” forcing desperate parents to “plea bargain” to a CPS fabricated crime, for the return of their children from foster care.

· CPS fabricates false allegations and most of their “investigations” to purposely mislead or misdirect a case.

· CPS intentionally fails to Criminally prosecute Parents accused of child abuse, since in the majority of cases, no initial crime has been committed. However, CPS continues to claim a crime has been committed, as THEY abuse/neglect our children.

· CPS knowingly abandons children into the foster care system, conscious that some individuals in these homes physically and/or sexually abuse those in their “protective” custody. CPS ignores crimes committed in foster care through failure to investigate.

· CPS fails to question these individuals for their abusive conduct, whereby, if it were a birth parent or not a foster care parent, these individuals would be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law in criminal court.

· CPS misrepresents themselves in positive personas by omitting, altering, and falsifying documents, so as to mislead the public and or government of their true actions as listed above. Thereby publicly grandstanding,displaying an inaccurate social martyrdom for the well being of children.

The Police should determine if children need protection from their own parents, since child abuse is a Criminal offense.

We dearly know, from our own personal case, the trauma and distress this thwarted government agency imposes (with no consequence) upon innocent families. In January 2008 the law office of Robert Powell won its appeal to the California 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. The case set a precedent by finding that CPS social workers are NOT entitled to absolute immunity for investigator conduct - particularly when they fabricate evidence, misrepresent evidence, and withhold exculpatory evidence. IF YOU FEEL THAT ANY OF THIS APPLIES TO YOUR FAMILY, email us at fightcpscalifornia -at- gmail.com. You can make a difference. Now is the time for action.

Note: This is intended for California residents only. Victims in other states can organize their own class action lawsuits.

I was reading through the comments this morning and noticed Cheryl wrote, “The stress that CPS has caused us is insurmountable.”

That brings back terrifying memories for me, and I’m sure all of you are experiencing the same thing. CPS workers find a family suffering through a difficult time, then figuratively KICK THEM WHILE THEY’RE DOWN, causing an overwhelming amount of added stress, only by this time we should be calling it TRAUMA.

CPS takes a family with a slight instability, then pours on the pain, takes the children, traumatizing them, perhaps for LIFE, and the parents of course are traumatized beyond what words can express.

By the time we parents get done working through a CPS case, we probably all have Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and should be getting SSI payments instead of having to work. I actually know one woman who did apply for SSI on this basis after getting her step-child back. And yes, she got the money.

After everything the American Nation has done to stress us out, traumatize us, and make our lives a living hell, do you think they should PAY? After all, it is the majority of TAX PAYERS who are supporting these demons, turning their back on our suffering from harsh laws and false accusations. Our lawmakers don’t change the laws because MOST AMERICANS DON’T CARE.

Who should pay if we need financial help after our lives are torn to shreds? What are your thoughts on this?

…

By the way, when you write your messages here, you don’t have to use your real name. Feel free to make something up as your regular ‘handle’ so you don’t ever have to be one of the people emailing me asking me to remove their names after they made comments here.

…

Written by Linda Martin for Fight CPS.

This lawsuit dated May 31, 2007 is against the Los Angeles County Department of Social Services. It alleges fraud, violation of kinship care rights, and loss of family love and support. It was filed by a former foster child and adoptive child.

Thanks to the person who sent this via email.

…

LAW FIRM, APC
Attorneys for Plaintiff: ELIZABETH J. BRUCE AKA ELIZABETH J. ALLDRIDGE

ELIZABETH J. BRUCE AKA ELIZABETH J. ALLDRIDGE,

Plaintiff,

vs.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, and DOES 1 through 20, Inclusive,

Defendants,

CASE NO.

TO ALL PARTIES HEREIN AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD

Plaintiff, ELIZABETH J. BRUCE, aka, ELIZABETH J. ALLDRIDGE, alleges as follows:

1. Plaintiff, ELIZABETH J. BRUCE, aka, ELIZABETH J. ALLDRIDGE (Date of Birth: April 17, 1972) is currently a resident of Clark County, Nevada, who lawfully changed her last name on March 8, 2007, from Alldridge to Bruce as part of her divorce decree. At all times pertinent hereto Plaintiff was a dependent of the Juvenile Court, County of Los Angeles, pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code §300(b) (and all predecessor statutes) and related California Regulations, subject to the control and authority of the County of Los Angeles Department of Public Social Services and related divisions or departments, including but not limited to what was known as the Department of Adoptions (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant DPSS”), throughout all proceeds related to or stemming from Plaintiff’s foster care and adoption.

2. Defendant DPSS was at all times pertinent hereto a department of a public entity created and existing under the laws of the State of California, with authority over children such as plaintiff.

3. The true and complete names of DOES 1 through 20 whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise are unknown to plaintiff who therefore sues said defendants by such fictitious names. At this time plaintiff does not have knowledge of all aspects of the claims set forth herein. Plaintiff will seek leave of Court to amend this Complaint to identify each Doe defendant’s name and capacity when same have been ascertained.

4. At all times herein mentioned, each defendant was acting through authorized employees or other agents, and was the agent, authorized representative, employee, or otherwise acting on behalf of each of the remaining defendants. In doing the things hereinafter mentioned, each defendant was acting within the course and scope of his or her employment, representation, and authority with the knowledge and consent of each remaining defendant.

5. The conduct of each defendant as alleged herein combined, cooperated, and contributed to the conduct of each other defendant such as to cause the herein described incidents, injuries, and events.

6. Plaintiff’s first suspension of any claim against Defendant DPSS occurred in late February 2006 or most likely in early March 2006 during a face to face meeting with Ms. Betty Anderson, a former aid of Assemblyperson Karen Bass, 47th Assembly District. Plaintiff sought Ms. Anderson’s assistance to acquire her Los Angeles County Department of Social Services records related to her foster care and eventual adoption. Plaintiff sought these records as part of her effort to find her biological mother (her biological father Donald Bruce died on February 26, 1974), and to acquire all available medical information related to both biological parents not only for herself, but more particularly for her children (her eldest son has suffered his entire life from Hydrocephalus.) During Plaintiff’s meeting with Ms. Betty Anderson, the Court records she was able to acquire from the Los Angeles County Juvenile Court concerning her adoption (all prior attempts to acquire DPSS social worker records were refused and/or denied) were discussed and reviewed. Ms. Betty Anderson pointed out to Plaintiff that it appeared the 1975 signature of her biological mother relinquishing all custody and control of Plaintiff when compared to signatures from Plaintiff’s biological mother’s criminal records appeared to be the signatures of different individuals. At this moment Plaintiff for the first time suspected that there may have been some violation of Defendant DPSS’s duties. Up until this meeting with Ms. Betty Anderson, Plaintiff was not looking for and had no suspicion or knowledge whatsoever of any type of a claim or injury related to any conduct of Defendant DPSS, as her motivation for acquiring records from Defendant DPSS was to find her mother and to find out all potential medical information she could.

7. On August 22, 2006, Plaintiff timely served by mail a Governmental Claim for Damages to Person or Property on Defendant DPSS pursuant to Government Code §911.2 (Exhibit A attached hereto). Defendant DPSS denied this claim in writing by mail on December 1, 2006. This suit is being filed within six (6) months of Defendant DPSS rejection of Plaintiff’s claim.

8. Plaintiff is the biological daughter of Brenda Joan Allen and Donald MacKenzie Bruce. In or about July 1973 Defendant DPSS initiated proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code §300 et seq. (or their predecessor statutes), and eventually acquired physical and legal custody of Plaintiff. Defendant DPSS was under a mandatory duty to acquire either a Court ruling of involuntary relinquishment of custody by Plaintiff’s biological mother or acquire the signature of Plaintiff’s biological mother on a “RELINQUISHMENT (Out of County)” County of Los Angeles Department of Adoptions form before placing Plaintiff up for adoption. Defendant DPSS acquired neither. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief Defendant DPSS falsified, forged, or otherwise misrepresented the signature of Plaintiff’s biological mother Brenda Joan Allen on August 26, 1975, on a “Relinquishment (Out of County)” form in violation of its mandatory duties order to expedite adoption.

9. On September 26, 1975, Plaintiff was placed in the home of Harold Augustus Barlow and Carole Leah Barlow, potential adoptive parents pursuant to a Notice of Adoption. This placement by Defendant DPSS and eventual adoption of Plaintiff by the same adopting parents was in further violation of Defendant DPSS’s mandatory duties in that she was first required to be placed with family members of Plaintiff, who had priority rights to physical and legal custody of Plaintiff over her eventual adoptive parents. Plaintiff’s family was ready, able and willing to assume all physical and legal custody of Plaintiff, to provide for her in all aspects and to provide her with a loving home. Said family members of Plaintiff included, but were not limited to, her paternal grandmother and grandfather who sent Defendant DPSS and others letters repeatedly offering and in all aspects indicating their willingness to take care of their granddaughter in a loving home.

10. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant DPSS’s breach of the foregoing mandatory duties, Plaintiff was placed in foster care of Defendant DPSS and eventually given up for adoption to Harold Augustus Barlow and Carole Leah Barlow. Harold Augustus Barlow died before Plaintiff turned four (4) years of age, and throughout the remaining years of her minority Plaintiff was neglected, abused, and generally ignored by her only remaining foster mother Carole Leah Barlow. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendant DPSS’s breach of the foregoing mandatory duties, Plaintiff suffered personal injury, the loss of care, comfort, love and society of her biological family, suffered severe emotional and personal distress, and continues to suffer personal injury and distress associated with the loss of so many years of family love and support in addition to continuing to suffer the consequences of her life as an unwanted adoptive child.

11. The damages sought herein are in excess of the minimal jurisdictional limits of this Court.

WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant DPSS, and DOES 1 through 20, as follows:

1. General damages in excess of the jurisdictional limits of this Court;

2. All medical, incidental expenses, and special damages according to proof;

3. Loss of earnings and earning capacity according to proof;

4. Costs of suit;

5. Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; and

6. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

DATED: May 31, 2007 LAW FIRM, APC

BY: ____________________________

In Orange County a mother has been awarded 4.9 million dollars in a case against CPS caseworkers and the Department of Social Services.

The mother, Deanna Fogarty-Hardwick, who lives in Seal Beach, claimed that CPS workers took her two young daughters in February 2000, and ‘intentionally misinformed the court’. The children were 9 and 6 at the time.

The kids were place in Orangewood Children’s Home for a month, then in a foster home for two months. After that they were placed with their father for two years. The parents now have joint custody.

Caseworkers failed to inform the court that the children were emotionally distressed by being separated from their parents, and refused to place them with relatives, whose Kinship Care rights should have been honored.

Jurors in this case wanted to send a message to social workers by awarding such a large amount of money to the mother.

The Director of Social Services was surprised, saying that he cannot recall ever seeing such a large settlement award (4.9 million dollars) but stated also that the caseworkers named in the lawsuit will keep their jobs, and that he supports their decisions.

Source: LA Times

I would like to remind the CPS director of this case in 2000: 4 million settlement in LA for a brain damaged foster child - too many CPS drugs ruined this child for life!

Snap Decision, a movie based on a true story, was released in 2001. Tonight I saw it for the first time on DVD. It was about a widowed mother of three, Jen, whose best friend, Carrie, arrived for an overnight visit. Carrie, a photographer from Chicago, was in town to receive an award at a banquet.

While Carrie was staying with them the three children, who were very young - ages 1, 4, and 7 - bounced into the bedroom early in the morning mostly undressed, and proceeded to do what kids do - which is have fun, jump around, and be playful. Carrie, the photographer, grabbed her camera and started taking pictures of the little ones, who were her godchildren.

After getting back to Chicago, Carrie had twenty rolls of film developed. When the developer saw 36 pictures of playful, mostly naked kids with adult women, she reported them to the police.

I’m not going to tell you the whole drama, but as you can imagine there were CPS workers and lawyers involved. The police detective was the most suspicious, accusing person in the film, and the CPS caseworker was much more understanding. From what I know as a family rights activist with over fifteen years experience helping families, this is odd because usually it is the caseworkers that families complain about, but it goes to show you never know who will be mentally well-balanced, and who will choose to see things in the most perverse way possible.

At Netflix the film has only 3.1 stars out of 2,721 ratings as of tonight. I gave it five stars because I think it gives a good portrayal of the kinds of stress placed on a family facing false accusations of child abuse or neglect, and because I appreciate that someone made a film showing a false accusation of child abuse.